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Abstract – Against the backdrop of a long standing research tradition on the topic of HRM 
systems, several prominent lines of research have been developed that offer central contribu-
tions to different aspects, questions and levels of HRM systems. Due to the fact that the estab-
lished conceptual and empirical approaches to HRM systems differ with respect to their levels 
of analysis, questions posed and methods used, the field is characterized by more or less heter-
ogeneous contributions and no clear overall structure. However, two central perspectives in 
the field of HRM systems research can be identified: A content-oriented approach and a proc-
ess-oriented approach. In order to connect these perspectives, we develop a set of criteria to 
analyze and compare systematically content-oriented research contributions in HRM systems 
research in terms of content-oriented as well as process-oriented aspects. On the one hand, we 
contribute a structured overview and systematic comparison of many different theoretical and 
conceptual approaches to HRM systems research, thus making it easier to access this dynamic 
field of research for scholars, practitioners and students. On the other hand, we derive implica-
tions for the better foundation and design of empirical studies, and thus we contribute to the 
fostering of empirical research about HRM systems. 
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Ein strukturierter Überblick über Forschungsbeiträge und offene Fragen  
Zusammenfassung – Vor dem Hintergrund einer langen Forschungstradition zum Thema 
„Betriebliche Beschäftigungssysteme“ bzw. „HRM systems“ haben sich zahlreiche For-
schungsansätze entwickelt, die Erklärungsbeiträge zu verschiedenen Aspekten, Fragen und 
Ebenen von betrieblichen Beschäftigungssystemen leisten. Da sich die konzeptionellen Ansät-
ze jedoch hinsichtlich der gestellten Forschungsfragen, der angewendeten Methoden sowie der 
Analyseebenen erheblich unterscheiden, weist das Forschungsfeld einen sehr heterogenen 
Charakter auf. Dabei können zwei zentrale Forschungsstränge identifiziert werden: Ein inhalts-
orientierter und ein prozess-orientierter Ansatz. Der zentrale Beitrag dieses Artikels liegt in 
einem systematischen Überblick und Vergleich der verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätze zu 
HRM Systemen, der sowohl Forschern und Praktikern als auch Studenten den Zugang zu 
diesem dynamischen Forschungsgebiet erleichtern soll. Zu diesem Zweck werden auf Basis 
eines systematisch entwickelten Kriteriensets zentrale Ansätze sowohl anhand von inhalts- als 
auch von prozess-orientierten Aspekten analysiert und verglichen. Ferner werden zentrale 
Implikationen als Ausgangspunkt für eine bessere theoretische Fundierung und Gestaltung 
zukünftiger empirischer Studien zu HRM Systemen abgeleitet. 
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1. Introduction  
Research on HRM systems already has a longstanding tradition. The basic idea in 
HRM systems research is that bundles, groups or clusters of complementary HRM 
activities may have large effects on firms’ economic performance and/or the achieve-
ment of HRM objectives, while changes in single HRM activities or the implementa-
tion of inconsistent HRM instruments, policies and practices have little or no positive 
effect, or even negative effects on these goals (Ichniowski/Shaw/Prennushi 1997; 
Ichniowski 1990; Bloom/Van Reenen 2010; Beckmann/Kuhn 2010). Two (or more) 
HRM activities are called complementary if the effect of one activity on a dependent 
variable depends on the level of the other activity (or activities) (Milgrom/Roberts 
1990, 1995). Given complementarity, we expect synergies between the respective 
HRM activities, with the result that the whole effect of the HRM system is more than 
the sum of the effects of the single HR practices (e. g. Beckmann/Kuhn 2010; Guth-
rie et al. 2009; Subramony 2009; Lepak et.al. 2006). 
Within the field of HRM systems, many different lines of research have devel-
oped. A comparatively new and thriving strand of empirical literature aims at measur-
ing HRM systems as bundles of HRM activities and tries to discover the economic 
effects for firms, the effects on workers and/or for unions (for reviews see Godard 
2004; Lepak et al. 2006; Delarue et al. 2008; Bloom/Van Reenen 2010). While many 
of these empirical studies claim to find a positive relationship between “innovative” 
HRM systems and economic variables (for example Black/Lynch 2001; Beckmann/ 
Kuhn 2010; Bloom/Van Reenen 2010; Guthrie 2001; Guthrie et al. 2009; Guthrie/ 
Messersmith 2010; Ichniowski et al. 1997), a closer look at the theoretical or concep-
tual basis of these studies reveals a huge variety in the HRM activities that are assumed 
to belong to the HRM system. In other words, the “contents” of the HRM systems 
analyzed are extremely diverse. For example, even within the group of empirical stud-
ies on the “high performance work system” (HPWS) approach, Godard (2004) finds 
very different combinations of employment and work organization practices analyzed 
leading to a more “work-intensification-oriented” and a more “involvement-oriented” 
variant of HPW-systems. Other authors (for example Beckmann/Kuhn 2010 and 
Wolf/Zwick 2008) empirically analyze the combination of financial incentives, em-
ployee participation and involvement instruments, while other aspects that are often 
scrutinized in research about HRM Systems, for example promotions, accumulation 
of specific human capital, long term employment or employment security, and wages 
that are bound to jobs rather than to individual performance are more or less neglect-
ed. Thus, the core concept of a HRM system as a bundle of specific complementary 
HRM activities that are expected to produce economic performance effects is rather 
underdetermined in this literature: There is much heterogeneity in the literature as to 
which specific bundles cause the effects found empirically and what the specific effect 
mechanisms and interaction between these practices are. 
This is partly due to the developments in the theoretical or more conceptual lines 
of research. Here, many and diverse lines of research have been developed and au-
thors have made contributions on different aspects, questions and levels of HRM 
systems. Nowadays, the field is characterized by approaches from different disciplines 
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such as sociology, economics and strategic human resource management, which differ 
with respect to levels of research, the questions posed and the methods used, so that 
the field is characterized by very heterogeneous contributions and no clear overall 
structure. Thus, a structured review and analysis of the heterogeneous conceptual 
approaches may help to clarify some of these issues and, thereby, foster a sound theo-
retical basis of future empirical research. 
In this paper, we therefore develop a structured set of criteria for reviewing di-
verse theoretical HRM systems approaches and give a systematic comparison of the 
main research lines and contributions within the field of HRM systems. We concen-
trate on approaches that focus explicitly on firms’ HRM systems and the related deci-
sions of firms to design and implement these HRM systems, while other, partially 
related approaches – for example with a stronger focus on nationwide differences in 
the institutional framing or functioning of labor markets – are not analyzed and not 
integrated into our comparison (e.g. the varieties of capitalisms approach (Hall/ 
Soskice 2001) or Marsden’s approach to employment systems (Marsden 1999)). The 
same is true for related approaches that have their central focus on other dependent 
variables, for example the effects on employment stability or the construct of the 
“Normalarbeitsverhältnis”, even if they use concepts very much related to HRM sys-
tems to analyze their research questions (e.g. Struck 2006; Knuth et al. 2002). 
We contribute a structured overview and systematic comparison of many differ-
ent theoretical or conceptual approaches to HRM systems research, thus making it 
easier to access this field of research for students, scholars and practitioners, on the 
one hand. On the other hand, we derive conclusions for a better foundation and de-
sign of empirical research, and thus we contribute to the fostering of empirical re-
search about HRM systems. 
After deriving a set of criteria for comparison in section 2, we compare the ap-
proaches in section 3 and conclude in section 4. 
2.  Strands of research about HRM systems –  
Deriving a set of criteria for comparison 
2.1 Content-oriented research 
Much of the rather early research on HRM systems had strong roots in labor market 
research and was based on economic and sociological approaches in labor market 
theory and labor market segmentation, which differentiated between different types of 
external and internal labor markets (e.g. Lutz/Sengenberger 1974; Biehler/Brandes/ 
Buttler/Gerlach/Liepmann 1981; Brandes/Buttler 1988; Köhler/Preisendörfer 1989). 
In sociology, the dual focus was on employer strategies, on the one hand, and labor 
market flexibility and mobility, on the other hand (see for an overview Köhler/Krause 
2010; Struck 2006). Starting initially from the basic differentiation between internal 
and external markets, this dichotomy was refined, on the one hand, by distinguishing 
two, qualitatively different types of external markets – the “good” or “primary” craft 
segment and the “bad” secondary market, and, on the other hand, by the classic dif-
ferentiation by Atkinson (1984) into four segments, characterized by functional or 
numerical flexibility and by internal or external flexibility. However, no HRM system 
was assigned to the fourth field in this scheme (“secondary internal market” or inter-
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nal numerical flexibility) for a long time. Newer approaches (e.g. Köhler/Krause 2010) 
fill this gap and differentiate between primary and secondary markets, on the one 
hand, and internal and external markets (or closed and open HRM systems), on the 
other hand. 
Within economics, internal labor markets were interpreted as an efficient instru-
ment to handle information deficit and asymmetries. For example, Alewell (1993) 
interpreted internal labor markets as institutional designs that help the employer to 
learn about the employees’ ability and motivation while they move up the internal job 
and promotion ladder. Gibbons and Waldman (1998) aim at explaining the available 
empirical facts about wage dispersion and promotion within firms. They thus formal-
ize the idea of internal labor markets in a micro economic model which focuses on 
promotion, symmetric or asymmetric learning about the employees’ innate ability and 
wage increases. However, they neglect other HRM instruments and policies. Transac-
tion cost economics as a very broad and general economic approach analyzes the de-
sign of contracts in a framework of underlying contractual problems such as uncer-
tainty and complexity of the environment, bounded rationality of contract partners, 
specificity of resources and opportunistic behavior. Within transaction cost econom-
ics, the article that focuses most closely on employment contracts and internal labor 
markets as HRM systems is Williamson/Wachter/Harris (1975). Here, the authors 
analyze one of these types of labor markets, the internal labor market, interpret it as a 
HRM system and as a collective contract supplementing the individual labor contracts, 
and essentially argue that specific human capital and the needs of firms to develop, 
deploy and maintain this resource are the main drivers of implementing HRM systems 
of this type. Later transaction cost economics analyses and differentiates between four 
coordinative designs within internal labor markets, given different combinations be-
tween high or low measurability of output and high and low importance of specific 
human capital (see, e.g. Sesselmeier/Funk/Waas 2010). 
Later research in business administration followed up and presented four differ-
ent types of “employment subsystems” (Osterman 1987), the implementation and use 
of which was interpreted as being a conscious and strategic decision by employers, 
dependent on production technology, social technology, legal restrictions from labor 
law and supply of manpower on the relevant labor market. Osterman (1988), for ex-
ample, differentiates between a “craft” and a “secondary” employment subsystem that 
are both embedded in the external labor market, and an “industrial” employment 
subsystem that is appropriate for “blue-collar” workers and a “salaried” employment 
subsystem that is appropriate for “white collar” workers while the latter subsystems 
are both embedded in the organization. Referring to Tsui and Wang (2002), the indus-
trial and the salaried models have a high resemblance to Lawler’s (1988) “job-
involvement” and “high-involvement” approaches as well as to Walton’s (1985) “con-
trol” and “commitment” HR strategies. In a similar vein, Hendry (1995, 2000, 2003) 
modified these ideas and defined seven different types of employment systems, which 
are partially closely related to Osterman’s types of employment subsystems. 
Within this line of research, the HRM strategies of employers were finally placed 
in the focus of research interests and thus spurred intensive debates between re-
searchers in HRM and in strategic management. Here, many contributions with a 
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focus on HRM results were published, for example, research on high performance 
work systems (Huselid 1995), high commitment work systems (Wright/Kehoe 2008; 
Xiao/Björkman 2006) or about the seven “best practices” of most successful employ-
ers (Pfeffer 1998).  
Many of these lines of research focus on the content of HRM systems, the specific 
kind of HR practices applied and bundled together and a resulting typology of differ-
ent kinds of HRM systems that can be interpreted as opposed “ideal types” or “arche-
types” on a theoretical continuum. The most prominent dichotomies are (for a de-
tailed overview see Hansen 2010): A “market-based” versus an “internal” HRM sys-
tem (Delery/Doty 1996; Kang/Snell 2009), a ”job-focused” versus an “organization-
focused” employee-organization relationship (Tsui/Pearce/Porter/Hite 1995; Tsui/ 
Wang 2002), a “cost-reduction” versus a “commitment maximizing” strategy (Arthur 
1992), a “control” versus a “commitment” HRM system (Arthur 1994), as well as an 
“internal labor market” and a “high-commitment” HRM system (Baron/Kreps 1999). 
Furthermore, Ouchi’s (1980) three ideal types of organizational control capture the 
whole range of typologies described above extending from a “market” form of control 
as external archetype to “bureaucracies” as a hybrid and “clans” (for the Japanese ideal 
type see Ouchi/Jaeger 1978) as internal extreme pole.  
In content-oriented research, the focus is thus on the number of and different types 
of employment subsystems with their specific combinations or bundles of comple-
mentary practices and policies, which stem from different functional areas of HRM 
and have differing effects on HR goals. Thus, criteria to compare the approaches are:   
 statements with regard to the number and type of different employment subsys-
tems, including the aspect of ideal type versus real type employment subsystems,  
 statements with regard to the content of the employment subsystems concerning 
areas of HRM, for example recruitment, wages, incentives and motivation, train-
ing, separation, 
 statements with regard to the specific basic HR problems to be solved by the HRM 
system or the type of effects that are expected by implementing the system. 
2.2 Process-, level and conceptually-oriented research on HRM systems 
However, newer research often takes another angle and concentrates not on the con-
tent but more on the conceptual aspects or on the “process” and level of HRM systems. 
These approaches often discuss general characteristics of HRM systems or try to 
structure HRM systems referring to their components, the organizational levels they 
may be found on and their strength. They thus focus not on content but on general 
aspects of the construction of the HRM system, for example the level in the organiza-
tion on which elements of the HRM systems are to be found, and what differentiates 
stronger from weaker HRM systems – whatever their specific content may be. 
Thus, these newer research approaches take a very different angle in analyzing 
HRM systems. These two perspectives – the content and the process perspective – 
have only rarely been combined in HRM research (but see Arthur/Boyles 2007; 
Ostroff/Bowen 2000). However, as the content-oriented approaches seem to differ 
quite strongly with respect to the criteria that may be derived from process-oriented 
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research, it may be fruitful to review the content-oriented approaches explicitly 
through the lens of process or levels based research. In addition to clarifying the range 
and status of results and the corresponding white spots in content-oriented research, 
there are many aspects regarding empirical research which result from this perspective, 
especially concerning the number and kind of levels of data collection and empirical 
measurement of HRM systems in general. 
Thus, in the following, we present a short summary of the relevant process-
oriented approaches, and derive criteria for the explicit comparison and structured 
review of the content-oriented approaches. 
Level of research and level of HRM systems: Micro-, meso- or macro 
Wright and Boswell (2002) give an outline and structured review of HRM research. 
They classify research in micro and macro research, on the one hand, and single and 
multiple practice research, on the other hand. In the resulting four-field-classification 
HRM system research is classified as the macro-multiple-practice corner of research. 
The level of macro research is described as the whole organization; the level of micro 
research as the individual or the single team or work group within an organization. 
However, the authors argue that the micro-macro-interface is blurred, needs much 
more attention and has not yet been handled adequately (p. 262ff). Thus they pose the 
additional question whether there are (one or more) relevant meso-research-levels in 
between micro and macro. For HRM systems research, this perspective leads to the 
question whether HRM systems are conceptualized at the macro-level, thus following 
the idea that one organization has one HRM system, or whether they are conceptual-
ized on the meso-level, thus following the idea that there will often be more than one 
HRM systems, which are applied for different segments of one organization. Included 
in this latter perspective is the question what the relevant segments are, for example 
departments, plants, groups of jobs, groups of employees, e.g. core versus peripheral 
employees – and how or by which criteria these are delineated. Thus, in reviewing and 
comparing HRM systems research approaches, two further criteria should be, 
 whether the organizational level the approach focuses at is explicitly stated and 
which one it is, and  
 whether the idea is that more than one different HRM systems may be in coexist-
ence within one firm, and if so, how the relevant segments of jobs and employees 
are characterized.  
Components of HRM systems 
Many of the empirical studies on HRM systems measure HRM systems on the level of 
practices or instruments applied in an organization. However, this conceptualization 
of HRM systems as bundles of practices or instruments may fall short of fully captur-
ing the systems aspect: Arthur and Boyles (2007) develop a five component system of 
HRM systems with principles, policies, programs, practices and climate as the five 
components structuring a HRM system. Thus, in contrast to the content-oriented 
literature, they focus on the question on which level(s) HRM systems can be concep-
tualized and measured empirically. With HR principles, they address stated values, be-
liefs and norms regarding what drives employee performance and how organizational 
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resources and rewards should be allocated. HR policies are characterized as organiza-
tional goals or objectives for managing human resources; the intended or considered 
HR strategy as opposed to actual or realized strategy, and the relative emphasis firms 
place on program choices in areas such as staffing, training, rewards, and job design. 
In contrast, HR programs are defined as the set of formal HR activities used in the 
organization. With HR practices they characterize the implementation and experience of 
an organization’s HR programs by lower level managers and employees. Programs and 
practices will potentially resemble each other to a high degree if programs are fully 
implemented. Last but not least, HR climate denotes the shared employee perceptions 
and interpretations of the meaning of the HR principles, policies, programs and prac-
tices in their firm. 
Thus, a first and important criterion resulting from this approach is  
 on which level or with regard to which components HRM systems are described 
and whether an approach clearly states the components and component level on 
which the HRM system is located. 
Behind this idea of the differing components of HRM systems lie two further, central 
and basic questions of HRM systems research: Firstly, with the components differing 
elements of HRM systems effects, their causes, effect mechanisms and relations to each 
other come into focus. For example, an HRM system that influences principles and 
policies, but does not change or address programs, practices and climate, may not 
influence motivation or commitment of employees, because it does not “reach” or 
encompass the individual level in an organization. Or, as a second example, an HRM 
system that addresses climate only, but does not influence principles, policies, pro-
grams and practices, may have only short-term effects because long term collective 
perceptions of employees are foiled by rivaling signals of other components. A further 
criterion to review content-oriented research is thus 
 whether an approach includes statements or an analysis concerning effect mecha-
nisms of HRM systems and related relationships between differing components.  
A second, narrowly related question resulting from this component approach is how 
and how intensively the differing components are thought of as a “system” with com-
plementary elements. Components may be conceptualized as more or less additive and 
independent elements of HRM, or they may be conceptualized as a system where 
components are complementary and closely coordinated, balanced or aligned with 
other components, such that all elements are necessary for the HRM system and its 
effects and form some functional logic together. Thus, a further criterion to review 
content-oriented research is   
 whether an approach includes statements or ideas about the “system” aspect of 
HRM systems and the question of complementary,  strongly interactive relations 
between the differing components  of HRM systems.    
Strength of employment subsystems 
Ostroff/Bowen (2000) and Bowen/Ostroff (2004) pose the question of how HRM 
systems affect individual behavior and firm performance. In searching for answers, 
they focus on the strength of these systems. Using social cognitive theory and Kelley’s 
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(1967) attribution theory, they conceptualize strength of an HRM system by three 
main elements (Bowen/Ostroff 2004): 
 Distinctiveness (meaning that the event-effect relationship is highly observable, for 
example, that the HRM system and its effects are visible and understandable to 
employees) 
 Consistency (meaning that the event-effect relationship presents itself the same 
across modalities and time, for example, for all the employees in the respective 
segment of the organization) 
 Consensus (there is agreement among individuals’ views of the event-effect rela-
tionship, for example, between members of the HRM department and line super-
visors). 
For the three main elements of the strength of an HRM system, the authors derive 9 
meta-features which help to generate a strong situation: 
Distinctiveness is influenced by visibility and understandability of the HRM system, as 
well as by the legitimacy of authority and (perceived) relevance of HRM. Consistency is 
strengthened by the instrumentality of consequences of employee behavior for goals, by the validity 
of HRM practices for what they purport to do and consistent HRM messages referring to differing 
levels of hierarchy which help to avoid double bind communication and give stability 
over time. Consensus is influenced by an agreement among principal HRM decision makers 
(for example line managers and HRM departments) and perceived fairness in distributive, 
procedural and interactional respect. 
According to Ostroff and Bowen, an HRM System that is high in distinctiveness, 
consistency, and consensus will create a “strong situation” (Bowen/Ostroff 2004: 
208). By this, the authors mean that the HRM system shapes the psychological climate 
in an organization in a way that individual perceptions and motivation are strongly 
aligned and oriented towards collective goals. On the contrary, a weak system will not 
be able to create strong effects, because individuals will not perceive and follow the 
same signals and guidelines for their work behavior. This idea is strongly related to the 
concept of psychological contracts in that “strong situations” result in clear and con-
sistent sets of employee expectations regarding employers’ goals and activities. 
Thus, a number of partial questions are relevant for the strength of the HRM sys-
tem (Ostroff/Bowen 2000): 
 Visibility of the system: Are HR processes and outcomes shared with employees? 
 Understandability and clarity of the system: Is the information easily understand-
able for employees? 
 Acceptability: Do employees buy into the system? 
 Consistency of administration: Are practices uniformly applied across employees 
and across time? 
 Effectiveness of administration and validity: Do practices do as designed? 
 Internal consistency: Is there a horizontal fit between practices and programs? 
 Intensity: How much time and effort is devoted to implementing the practices?  
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Thus, the authors effectively pose the question what degree of strength is needed to 
constitute an effective HRM system that efficiently helps to reach the HRM goals the 
employers follow. Is, for example, an HRM system that is well planned and has in-
tended high internal fit, but is not thoroughly implemented, nevertheless a strong 
system, or does it create only weak situations which do not strongly influence individ-
ual behavior and firm performance? Which degree of strength is needed for a system 
to be perceived as a “system” and not only as a more or less coincidental combination 
of single HRM measures, instruments or practices? Thus, a further criterion to review 
content-oriented research is   
 whether an approach includes statements or ideas about the “strength of the 
system” or some of the variables denoting strength in the approach of Ostroff/ 
Bowen (2000). 
2.3 Aggregation:  
Criteria for the comparison of employment systems approaches 
Criteria to review and compare HRM systems research are thus: 
 NUMBER and TYPE: statements with regard to the number and type of differ-
ent employment subsystems, including the aspect of ideal type versus real type 
employment subsystems. 
 COEXISTENCE: whether the idea is that more than one different HRM systems 
may coexist within one firm. 
 CONTENT: statements with regard to the content of the specific firms’ em-
ployment subsystems concerning areas of HRM, for example, recruitment, wages, 
incentives and motivation, training, separation. 
 BASIC HR-PROBLEMS: statements with regard to the specific basic HRM 
problems to be solved by the HRM system or the type of effects that are ex-
pected by implementing the system. 
 COMPONENTS: Whether the components of the HRM system and the organi-
zational level they are found on are clearly described. 
 LEVEL: whether the organizational level (micro, meso or macro level) the ap-
proach focuses on is explicitly stated and which one it is. 
 EFFECT MECHANISMS: whether an approach includes statements or analysis 
concerning effect mechanisms of HRM systems and related relationships between 
differing components.  
 SYSTEM ASPECT: whether an approach includes statements or ideas about the 
“system” aspect of HRM systems and the question of complementary relations 
between the differing components of HRM systems. 
 STRENGTH: whether an approach includes statements or ideas about the 
“strength of the system” or some of the variables denoting strength in the ap-
proach of Ostroff/Bowen (2000). 
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In the following, we compare the most important and most often cited conceptual 
content approaches to HRM systems – in order of the year of publication of the indi-
vidual research paper.  
3.  Comparing and reviewing content-oriented HRM systems research 
In the following, we use the criteria derived in section 2 to give a structured review of 
important HRM systems approaches. A short summary of results is also given in form 
of two tables. 
3.1 Transaction cost economics (Williamson/Wachter/Harris 1975) 
Transaction cost economics as a very broad and general approach analyzes the design 
of contracts in a framework of underlying contractual problems due to uncertainty 
and complexity of the environment, bounded rationality of contract partners, specific-
ity of resources and opportunistic behavior. The paper within transaction cost eco-
nomics that focuses most closely on employment contracts and HRM systems is Wil-
liamson/Wachter/Harris (1975). Here, the authors focused on one of these types of 
HRM systems, the so-called internal labor market. This HRM system is interpreted as 
a “collective contract” supplementing the individual labor contracts. These individual 
contracts are deficient in solving all the basic contractual problems under the condi-
tions of uncertainty and complexity, opportunism and specific skills. The “collective” 
contract or HRM-System is viewed as complementing the “authority relations”, the 
transaction cost minimizing – and therefore “best” – type of individual labor contract. 
As only one type of system is considered explicitly, no coexistence of differing sys-
tems within one firm is analyzed. However, the potential coexistence of different 
types of individual contracts within one firm is assumed in the approach, and condi-
tions under which certain types of individual contracts are efficient governance mech-
anisms are described. Thus, conditions under which no authority relation and thus no 
internal labor market as complement are to be expected may be derived. Central char-
acteristics of the internal labor market are long-term employment perspectives for 
employees, ports-of-entry jobs which are connected by promotion ladders with jobs 
on higher hierarchical levels, wages bound to jobs, promotion (lay-offs) by (reverse) 
seniority and/or performance and a high importance of specific human capital. Thus, 
there is a mixture of instruments and policies which form the components of the HR 
system. 
In this conceptualization, the basic HR problems to be solved by the system are the 
endowment with specific human capital and the minimization of transaction costs of 
individual contracts in situations with high needs for specific human capital. Concern-
ing the level of the system, there are no clear statements to our knowledge, but one 
can assume that the whole organization with all employees is meant and thus we have 
a macro-level HR system. Another possible interpretation is that ILMs exist for seg-
ments of jobs and employees where firm-specific human capital is important, thus 
leaving us with a meso-level approach which is sort of underdetermined with regard to 
the question in which areas firm-specific human capital is important and whether the 
authors overestimate the importance of firm-specific human capital under conditions 
of uncertainty and complexity of the environment (see Alewell 1993 for an intensive 
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discussion of this question). Differing components of the HRM system are mentioned 
but the type of components is not explicitly stated: practices (e.g. internal promotions, 
wages tied to job requirements), policies (e.g. long term employment) and principles 
and climate (stressing seniority in promotions, orientation of interests, transaction 
atmosphere). Effect mechanisms analyzed are that firm-specific human capital increases 
the risk of opportunism by a fundamental transformation of the employment relation. 
The ILM as a remedy results in an “orientation of interests” of individual employees 
on the current employer, and thus mitigates individual opportunism, helps to keep up 
a high motivation to build up firm-specific human capital and curbs the number of 
wage negotiations of specifically qualified employees. However, the theoretical basis 
of these assumptions about individual behavior is weak, because processes of “orien-
tation of interests” are not related back to any models of individual behavior. High 
importance of firm-specific human capital results – via the required incentives for 
more experienced workers to teach less experienced workers and the incentives for all 
workers to acquire specific human capital – in high importance of seniority and long-
term employment. The relationship between seniority and performance as promotion 
criteria is not analyzed explicitly; the authors refer to both criteria interchangeably. 
The implicit statement is that all elements of the system are needed complementary 
and in interaction with each other to achieve results in curbing opportunism and min-
imizing resulting transaction costs; however, this is not explicitly proved. Although the 
approach focuses on transaction costs, the costs of HRM systems are not analyzed 
explicitly, for example, the potential overhead cost of long term employment or of the 
dominance of seniority over performance in assessing and promoting workers. 
There are no explicit statements about the strength of the system. But the central 
idea in the approach is that the ILM is a simple system with a clear structure, imple-
mented for all employees with firm-specific human capital to collectively complement 
incomplete individual contracts and to focus individual interests on the collective or 
employers’ perspective. Thus, the system is normatively conceptualized as an ideally 
strong system which has clear cut incentives and sends visible signals how to act with-
in the individual employment relation. Implementation is not discussed explicitly. 
3.2 Munich segmentation theory (Lutz 1987) 
Lutz (1987) describes three differing labor market segments or Human Resource Sys-
tems. Following his basic aim to explain aspects of labor market structure, he analyzes 
HRM systems as systematically designed bundles of HRM practices in organizations 
(see Alewell 1993 for a more detailed discussion of the 1987 approach, 
Köhler/Krause 2010 with a discussion of some later modifications by Lutz himself 
and newer developments). 
The three HRM systems are the internal labor market (which, if closed under 
specific circumstances, is also called enterprise specific labor market segmentation), 
and two external market segments, the craft segment and the secondary segment. 
Coexistence of the different systems within one firm is explicitly assumed as possible 
(Lutz 1987: 30ff.), and thus the relevant level of the approach is the meso-level. The 
internal labor market is a system with carefully crafted task-job allocation, ports of entry 
and promotion ladders, which result in a systematic build up of specific human capital 
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for employees transferring along these job ladders. Long-term employment and exter-
nal recruitment only via the ports of entry are combined with these elements to form 
the ILM. Craft systems are intensely shaped by norms of external institutions regarding 
allocation, gratification, performance and personnel assignment. Employees and em-
ployer have a strong bond or orientation to the external market; and promotion, job 
security and human capital build up is realized by changing between employers or by 
using external institutions rather than by being promoted internally. Tayloristic systems 
are characterized by a tayloristic work organization, constant, employer driven fluctua-
tion in the workforce and very simple and repetitive jobs which can be fulfilled by 
employees with very basic qualifications only. There is no employment security at all 
for the personnel.   
In this approach, HRM systems are a direct expression of the firm’s HR strategy, 
which is implemented to secure necessary endowment with personnel at reasonable 
cost. However, the HR problem that the approach focuses on most intensely is the 
efficient answer to skilling problems. Motivation and related incentive problems, 
which may influence HR cost and endowment with human capital, too, are much less 
important in this approach. 
The organizational level of HRM systems is clearly and unambiguously determined 
as a meso-level, as each of the HR systems is relevant for groups of employees with 
certain qualifications – the ILM for employees with firm-specific human capital, the 
craft system for professional and craft type qualifications and the secondary or 
tayloristic system for more or less unqualified workers. If, and if so, how, these groups 
are defined and whether they may overlap remains an open question. Components of the 
systems are a mixture of specific instruments (wages based on tasks of the job; pro-
motion by seniority, human capital build up on the job) and policies (long-term em-
ployment in ILM versus strong market orientation in tayloristic and craft systems). 
Central effect mechanisms of the HR systems are discussed for the build up of specif-
ic human capital. While general qualifications of professional and craft workers are 
built up in external institutions, specific human capital is built up within the firms’ 
work system and promotion ladders. By carefully crafting the type and sequence of 
jobs, an employee is assigned to, and the jobs of the supervisors he works with, the 
build up of specific human capital is crafted, too. Thus, the central effect mechanisms 
assumed in this approach for ILMs are learning on the job and from other employees 
and the binding of employees with specific human capital. 
Statements about the system aspect are not completely clear in this approach. On 
the one hand, the systemic and interactive character of the elements of the HR sys-
tems becomes quite clear as HR is analyzed as a system and as a systematically de-
signed expression of a firm’s HR strategy. With regard to the closure of ILMs, it is 
discussed that firms will have to bear some disadvantages as, for example, a loss of 
flexibility regarding the variation of the elements of a closed system. Thus, in compar-
ison to the transaction cost approach, some more elements of employers cost in im-
plementing the HRM systems are integrated. On the other hand, the approach focuses 
on qualification problems, while other HR problems as, for example, motivation and 
incentive aspects, are not discussed intensively. Thus, in the view of the approach 
some of the HR measures (skilling, job descriptions, promotion ladders, ports of en-
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try) are discussed as complementary and as systematically combined, but for others 
(e.g. incentives, wages), we cannot draw any clear conclusions about their systemic 
relevance. 
Strength of the system, degree of implementation, visibility, clarity etc. are not ex-
plicitly discussed in this approach. However, the central mechanism of closure of 
ILMs is described via the increasing bilateral obligations between employer and em-
ployees. Thus, with increasing closure of ILMs a strong system should grow – highly 
visible for both parties, strong bilateral obligations with clear-cut promises. Addition-
ally, the features of a craft or professional market are shaped by external norms of 
performance, of gratification, allocation and personnel assignment, thus resulting in a 
system that is as strong as the surrounding institutions. All in all, the strength of the 
system is assumed for certain situations, but conditions that foster the strength of the 
system or effects of weak systems are not discussed explicitly. 
3.3 From control to commitment to high performance HRM systems  
(Walton 1985; Arthur 1992, 1994; Huselid 1995) 
Referring to Walton (1985), since the middle of the 1970s, most companies in the U.S. 
have gone through a transitional stage in their work force management which results 
in the transformation of their HR strategy: “factory after factory, there is a revolution 
under way in the management of work” (p. 77). To illustrate this tendency Walton 
contrasts the HR practices in two different plants of a big U.S. company operating in 
the chemical industry. Walton traces these differences in plant performance back to 
the alternative adoption of two different strategies in managing the work force (HR 
policies in terms of components): A strategy “imposing control”, on the one hand, and 
a strategy “eliciting commitment”, on the other hand (p. 78).  
The control strategy is implemented to “establish order, exercise control, and 
achieve efficiency in the application of the work force” (p. 78). It is based on speciali-
zation and the division of work into narrowly defined jobs with fixed working tasks. 
This corresponds to a deep hierarchy of jobs which is related to specific status sym-
bols and goes hand in hand with top-down decision making. Labor is seen as a cost 
variable rather than a resource worth investing in. Employees do not have any em-
ployment security although this can be seen as the central goal of unionization at-
tempts. The prevailing compensation practices follow the rule of “a fair day’s pay for a 
fair day’s work” (p. 78).  
In contrast, since the early 1970s an increasing adoption of a commitment strategy 
can be observed by a number of large companies such as General Foods, General 
Motors or Proctor & Gamble. These companies have implemented flat hierarchies 
and have minimized status differences, increased control spans, introduced quality 
circles and a flexible job design with broader skill requirements and responsibilities 
that combines planning and implementation. Instead of realizing governance through 
formal rules systems, control and coordination are orientated towards shared goals 
that refer to high performance standards and a continuous improvement of processes 
within a learning organization. Accordingly, compensation practices are based on in-
dividual as well as on team performance measures and encompass profit and gain 
sharing as well as stock ownership programs. Finally, employees have a long-term 
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employment perspective that may be accomplished by training and retraining efforts 
of the particular employer. 
Against the backdrop of Walton’s general distinction between a control and a 
commitment HR strategy, Arthur (1994) explores a strategic HRM approach to analyze 
the impact of a control system (“cost reducers”) and a commitment (“maximizer”) 
system (Arthur, 1992 with reference to Lawler, 1986 and Walton, 1985) on organiza-
tional performance outcomes in US steel minimills. On the basis of a cluster analysis, 
Arthur tests the proposition that the two HRM systems have a significantly different 
impact on the level of employee turnover and manufacturing performance (measured 
as scrap rate and labor efficiency). Furthermore, Arthur considers the nature of the 
HR system as an important factor that influences the relationship between firm per-
formance and the negative consequences of turnover such as the disruption of com-
mitment and social structures and sunk costs for onboarding and training expendi-
tures. 
On the basis of a regression analysis, Arthur shows that the required labor hours 
per ton were significantly lower in the commitment HR system than in the control HR 
system. However, because the scrap rate in the overall regression model turned out to 
be non-significant, Arthur’s first hypothesis that “Plants with commitment human resource 
systems will have better manufacturing performance than plants with control human resource systems” 
(Arthur, 1994: 673) could not be entirely confirmed. In contrast, the second hypothe-
sis “Turnover will be higher in control human resource systems than in commitment human resource 
systems” (p. 674) was confirmed because the turnover in the control HR system was 
over twice as high as in the commitment system and the difference was statistically 
significant. Altogether, Arthur was able to confirm the theoretical proposition that his 
empirically developed taxonomy of HR systems can be “significantly associated with 
variations in steel minimills’ performance” (p. 682). 
Against the backdrop of these and other former studies on High-Commitment 
HRM systems Huselid (1995) focuses on the empirical investigation of the relationship 
between systems of High Performance Work (HPW) practices (that can be understood 
as bundles of “best” High-Commitment practices) and corporate financial perfor-
mance measures, thus effectively concentrating on one side of the Walton-Arthur-
HR-Systems dichotomy. The point of departure is the assumption that “HRM practic-
es influence employee skills through the acquisition and development of a firm’s hu-
man capital” (p. 637), and that if HRM practices do not secure an appropriate level of 
employee motivation and performance and a certain degree of freedom regarding the 
way a job is performed, the full effectiveness of a highly qualified work force will not 
be utilized. The outlined HPW practices include a comprehensive recruiting and selec-
tion of employees, an extensive training to improve the employee’s knowledge and 
skills, an increased employee involvement and participation in job design as well as 
incentive compensation and performance management systems. This combination of 
“best practices” (Pfeffer 1994, 1998) is supposed to enhance employee’ motivation 
and retention, decrease shirking and influence nonperformers to exit.  
In summary, Huselid’s study strongly supports the assumption that the imple-
mentation of HPW practices will lead to a lower employee turnover and a higher level 
of productivity and firm performance. Both factors of HPW practices were positively 
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related to productivity and corporate financial performance. In contrast to the “em-
ployee skills and organizational structures”-factor that was significant and negatively 
related to turnover, the “employee motivation”-factor was not significant. Huselid 
explains this finding by the fact that the implementation of an incentive compensation 
system may force lower-than-average performing employees to leave the firm. In 
terms of productivity, both factors were positive and significant when entered indi-
vidually. However, when entered mutually, only the second factor remained signifi-
cant. Therefore, Huselid suggests the adoption of a system perspective as very im-
portant. As opposed to the convincing theoretical argument that a higher degree of 
internal and external fit of HRM practices will lead to a higher level of firm perfor-
mance, Huselid concludes that his results “did not support the contention that either 
type of fit has any incremental value over the main effects associated with the use of 
High Performance Work Practices” (p. 665-666).  
Following Huselid (1995), a large number of studies on HPWS has evolved, often 
showing a strong normative focus on best practice implications. This HPWS paradigm 
was heavily criticized by Godard (2004). Beside a detailed critique of many aspects of 
the empirical work and its interpretations by researchers, Godard fundamentally criti-
cizes the approach for neglecting the underlying differences in employers’ and em-
ployees’ interest, which hampers the evolution of high levels of trust, commitment 
and identification in full blown HPWS systems. The main conceptual aspect here is 
that the HPWS paradigm does not integrate basic assumptions about the employment 
relation and individual motives of work behavior adequately. Additionally, the possi-
bility that intermediate levels of HPW practices and thus a “weaker” HPWS system 
could be superior to a “stronger HPWS system” in terms of economic performance 
because it helps to reach the same level of employee performance but causes a lower 
level of cost is neglected by many researchers. However, later empirical studies (e.g. 
Beckmann/Kuhn 2010; Wolf/Zwick 2008) address this last issue by studying labor 
efficiency (instead of productivity) as dependent variable. 
In comparing Walton’s (1985), Arthur’s (1992, 1994) and Huselid’s (1995) semi-
nal studies in terms of central HR problems addressed, levels of analysis, effect mech-
anisms and strength of the HR system the following suggestions can be made: The 
implementation of a commitment HR strategy as described by Walton (1985) can be 
seen as organizational attempt to face existing HR problems such as high labor costs 
and high absenteeism rates and an unsatisfied and unmotivated work force. Against 
the backdrop of the observed changes in the U.S. company landscape, Walton devel-
ops a normative recommendation for the necessary implementation of the commit-
ment system in all companies to reach higher levels of performance standards and 
realize tangible dividends. In contrast, Arthur (1994) only indirectly refers to the basic 
HR problem by discussing two opposed HR systems – control versus commitment – as 
“different approaches” (HR policies) “to shaping employee behaviors and attitudes at 
work” (p. 672). In terms of content-based criteria, the comprehensive implementation 
of HPW practices (Huselid 1995) to enhance employee skills and motivation can be 
interpreted as solution for the central HR problems of a firms’ endowment with motiva-
tion and skills.  
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Referring to the level of analysis, Walton (1985) analyzes the meso-level of the pro-
duction plant. However, on a macro-level of analysis, the implementation of a commit-
ment system is suggested to lead to a higher firm performance by enhancing individu-
al’s motivation and work satisfaction and reaching standards of excellence. Arthur’s 
(1992, 1994) and Huselid’s (1995) analyses strongly refer to the macro-level of HRM 
systems and their firm-level influence on organizational performance. In applying a 
strategic perspective, Arthur (1994) explicitly chooses a macro-level approach to HR 
systems in firms with one minimill respectively one HR system. 
Walton’s (1985) chain of reasoning encompasses central effect mechanisms of HR 
strategies: The implementation of a commitment system is suggested to lead to a 
higher firm performance by enhancing individual’s motivation and work satisfaction 
and reaching standards of excellence. Additionally, Arthur (1994) suggests that the HR 
systems moderate the relationship between turnover and manufacturing performance 
by creating a specific organizational context (climate). Throughout the sample, the 
commitment-based minimills reached a higher level of productivity, lower employee 
turnover as well as superior scrap rates than the control-based ones. In particular, 
these results confirm Walton’s observations (1985) in the context of technologically 
intensive manufacturing. Also the HPW practices are suggested to positively influence 
a firm’s overall performance by reducing the level of turnover and increasing produc-
tivity and corporate financial performance.  
In suggesting a wide variety of company-specific forms that result in a “larger 
shape” or an “overall pattern” (p. 77) of HR strategy in a specific plant, Walton (1985) 
explicitly refers to the system aspect of the described HRM practices in control and 
commitment systems. By clustering specific HR patterns into two categories of HR 
with reference to the concept of equifinality, Arthur (1994) directly addresses the sys-
tem aspect of HRM practices. Also in Huselid’s (1995) study, the system aspect is explicitly 
analyzed through the measurement of the influence of internal and external fit of 
HPW practices. However, the results of the empirical study do not prove the theoreti-
cal argument and hypothesis that a higher level of internal consistent HRM practices 
lead to a higher firm performance. On the contrary, the average level of implemented 
HPW practices is rather important in this connection, thus, pointing at the additive 
instead of complementary effect of these instruments.  
By stating the underlying normative recommendation of the superior commit-
ment system, the aspect of the strength of the HRM system is implicitly addressed by 
Walton (1985): After a firm has gone through a transitional stage and has fully imple-
mented a commitment strategy the strength of a system is able to unfold its positive 
effects which lead to a higher level of plant performance in all categories. Turning to 
Arthur’s (1992; 1994) studies, its explicit aim was to test the particular systems’ strength 
in moderating the relationship between a minimills’ turnover and manufacturing per-
formance. However, in contrast to Ostroff and Bowen’s (2000; also Bowen/Ostroff 
2004) concept, this notion of strength refers to the strength of a specific effect mech-
anism of a HRM system. Finally, in the HPWS paradigm, the relative strength of a 
HPW system is interpreted as the implementation of more instruments that focus on 
high performance that can be associated with reaching a higher level of firm perfor-
mance. Simultaneously, this reflects the general logic behind the HPWS concept. 
106  Dorothea Alewell, Nina Katrin Hansen: Human Resource Management Systems 
 
3.4 Osterman’s employment systems in internal labor markets  
(Osterman 1987) 
Osterman (1987) describes four real type HRM systems which he found in firms he 
interviewed about their HRM system; the industrial subsystem, the salaried subsystem, 
the craft subsystem and the secondary subsystem. There are explicit statements that 
these systems may coexist within one firm and are typically applied to differing groups 
of employees. Thus the level of the subsystems is defined by broadly defined groups of 
employees and the approach is clearly rooted on the meso-level. The industrial subsystem 
is characterized by narrowly and explicitly defined jobs, which are organized within 
job ladders. Thus, functional flexibility of the employer with regard to jobs and tasks 
is low. Employees are transferred along these job ladders by seniority; wages depend 
on jobs. Layoffs are possible and organized by reversed seniority, thus there is some 
numerical flexibility for the employer. Training and development are dominantly in-
ternally organized. Blue collar workers form the dominant group within this type of 
HRM system. The salaried subsystem addresses mainly white collar workers. Broad, 
flexible job descriptions with a high functional flexibility are combined with strong 
employment security and performance-related wages and promotions for employees. 
Trainings are dominantly internally organized. Craft subsystems combine broad and 
flexible job descriptions with individually negotiated wages. There are no internal 
promotions and no job security. The externally trained craft workers improve their 
hierarchical status and wage by changing the employer. Secondary subsystems are 
characterized by very narrow, but not strictly defined jobs. There are no promotions 
and no job security for the employees, who have only very basic qualifications and no 
formal training, and wages are job-dependent and low. Thus, the described components of 
the subsystems are programs and practices (promotions, wage setting, trainings) and 
policies (employment security). 
Basic HR problems the employer addresses with the subsystems are cost efficiency, 
flexibility of HR resources and predictability of relevant HR aspects (Osterman 1987: 
54ff.). The relation of these goals of the employer with each other remains somewhat 
blurred, as flexibility and predictability could well be means to reach cost efficiency. 
The relevant effect mechanisms are not explicitly analyzed by Osterman, but he gives a 
number of examples how specific components of the subsystems relate to the em-
ployer’s goals and basic HR problems, for example, he argues that firm internal pro-
motion ladders and training may improve the predictability of relevant HR variables as 
labor supply and wages are better controllable by the employer as with external in-
struments. With respect to the systems aspect, Osterman is quite explicit, on the one 
hand. Firstly, he states that there are a number of restrictions (from the fields of pro-
duction technology, social technology, labor supply and through the law) which influ-
ence the employers’ choice of employment subsystems (Osterman 1987: 59ff). Sec-
ondly, he argues that instruments and practices may have, depending on the re-
strictions, conflicting impact on the three differing goals of the employer. Thus, an 
important aspect of designing subsystems is to balance practices and policies that have 
conflicting effects on employers’ goals and the respective trade-offs between basic HR 
problems. Thus, with Osterman’s approach there is no “optimal” subsystem in the 
sense of a first-best-system, but one or more “second best” subsystems with regard to 
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differing combinations of goals and restrictions. Firm-specific weighing of goals and 
firm-specific restrictions influence the partial efficiency of HR subsystems for the 
employer. As a result, there may be HR subsystems which have a conflicting impact 
on employers’ goals, which will hamper the strength of the respective system as there 
may be conflicting messages sent by the system. 
On the other hand, Osterman does not stress complementarities between single 
practices or instruments. In his approach, system effects are more related to balancing 
flexibility and security for employer and employees by a specific mixture of HRM 
practices and policies. With this, indirect cost effects are analyzed as a trade of be-
tween differing areas of flexibility and their relationship to workers’ preferences for 
security. Additionally, direct cost elements for the employer are integrated in his ap-
proach. Cost efficiency is one of the employer’s goals in implementing HRM systems. 
Compared to the three contributions discussed so far (for a detailed comparison of 
3.1-3.4 see table 1), Osterman’s contribution is far more balanced with regard to as-
sumptions about skill requirements, types of HRM systems and employers cost, but, at 
the same time, it is much less explicitly designed.   
Table 1:  
Criteria Approach/Theory  
Transactions Cost 
Economics  
(Williamson/ 
Wachter/Harris 
1975) 
From Control to Commitment to 
High Performance HR Systems 
(Walton 1985; Arthur 1994; 
Huselid 1995) 
Old Segmentation 
Theories (Lutz 
1987)  
Osterman’s  
Employment 
Systems in Inter-
nal Labor Markets 
(1987) 
Content Criteria 
1. Number 
and Type of 
HRM sys-
tems 
One Type: 
1. Internal labor 
market;  only 
system on the 
collective level, 
complementing 
four types of  
contracts on 
individual level 
Walton (1985): Three Types 
1. Control versus  
2. Commitment HR system 
3. A transitional stage 
 
Arthur (1994): Two Types  
1. Control versus  
2. Commitment HR system 
 
Huselid (1995): One Type  
1. HPWS  
Three Types: 
1. Internal labor 
market 
2. Craft markets / 
professional HRM 
system 
3. Secondary labor 
market/  ”every men 
market” / tayloristic 
HRM system 
Four  Types: 
1. Industrial sub-
system 
2. Salaried sub-
system 
3. Craft subsystem 
4. Secondary sub-
system 
2. Coexist-
ence of 
differing 
types of 
HRM sys-
tems within 
one organi-
zation 
 Only one type of 
HRM systems is 
analyzed; 
 therefore no 
coexistence of 
differing systems 
possible 
 Walton (1985):  Yes, explicitly  
 Arthur (1994):    Yes, explicitly  
 Huselid (1995):  No  
 Yes  Yes 
3. Central 
content 
based state-
ments    
 Long-term 
employment 
perspectives for 
employees; 
 ports-of-entry-
jobs which are 
connected by 
promotion lad-
ders with other 
jobs, 
 wages bound to 
 Walton (1985): normative rec-
ommendation of a change to-
wards the commitment system; 
assumption that employees can 
be motivated by giving them 
greater responsibilities and high-
er degrees of freedom in accom-
plishing their job tasks; this is 
assumed with the potential to 
reach higher levels of tangible 
dividends 
HRM systems differ 
centrally by the 
 expected duration 
of  employment 
relations,  
 dominant type 
and level  of quali-
fication of employ-
ees, its degree of 
specificity and its 
relation to exter-
HRM systems differ 
centrally by the 
 broadness of job 
description 
 promotion and 
layoff rules 
 employment 
guarantees 
 wage modalities 
 type of educa-
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Criteria Approach/Theory  
Transactions Cost 
Economics  
(Williamson/ 
Wachter/Harris 
1975) 
From Control to Commitment to 
High Performance HR Systems 
(Walton 1985; Arthur 1994; 
Huselid 1995) 
Old Segmentation 
Theories (Lutz 
1987)  
Osterman’s  
Employment 
Systems in Inter-
nal Labor Markets 
(1987) 
jobs, 
 promotion (lay-
offs) by (re-
verse) seniority 
and/or perfor-
mance,  
 high importance 
of specific hu-
man capital 
 Arthur (1994): empirically derived 
a taxonomy of HR systems: con-
trol versus commitment; control 
HR system is associated with the 
implementation of formal rules 
and procedures and output-
oriented compensation practices 
that secure a higher level of labor 
efficiency and lower direct labor 
costs; in contrast, the commit-
ment HR system is associated 
with the constitution of relational 
psychological contracts, a higher 
involvement of skilled employees 
as well as group problem solving 
 Huselid, (1995): recommendation 
of one HMR system – the HPWS 
consisting of best HRM practices; 
assumption that a higher degree 
of implemented HPW practices 
will lead to a higher firm perfor-
mance 
nal institutions 
 practices of con-
trol  and incen-
tives set for em-
ployees 
 type and level of 
job requirements      
tion 
 typical segment 
of employees 
4. Basic HR 
problems 
adressed 
 
 Endowment with 
specific human 
capital;  
 Minimizing 
transaction costs 
of individual con-
tracts  in situa-
tions with high 
specific human 
capital 
 Walton (1985): implementation of 
a commitment HR strategy to 
work force management to face 
existing HR problems such as 
high labor costs and high absen-
teeism rates and an unsatisfied 
and unmotivated work force 
 Arthur (1994): discussion of “two 
different approaches to shaping 
employee behaviors and attitudes 
at work” that create an organiza-
tional context and through this 
have a certain impact on the con-
sequences of turnover and, 
therefore, lead to different levels 
of manufacturing performance 
 Huselid (1995): comprehensive 
implementation of HPW practices 
to enhance employee skills and 
motivation 
 
 Procurement of 
right type of hu-
man capital and 
corresponding 
type of HR flexibil-
ity; 
 Especially de-
manding  tasks 
for specific human 
capital  
 Cost efficiency, 
flexibility of HR 
resources, pre-
dictability of rel-
evant HR as-
pects 
Process Criteria 
5. Compo-
nents 
 No explicit 
statement; prac-
tices, policies 
and climate are 
all mentioned 
 Walton (1985): no explicit state-
ment; description of HR practices 
as central components; HR poli-
cies (e. g. the employment per-
spective) and principles are men-
tioned (implicitly)  
 Arthur (1994): no explicit state-
ment; especially practices and 
policies are discussed; the organ-
izational context could be related 
 No explicit state-
ment; practices 
and policies are 
most often men-
tioned 
 No explicit 
statement, but 
practices and 
policies are most 
often mentioned 
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Criteria Approach/Theory  
Transactions Cost 
Economics  
(Williamson/ 
Wachter/Harris 
1975) 
From Control to Commitment to 
High Performance HR Systems 
(Walton 1985; Arthur 1994; 
Huselid 1995) 
Old Segmentation 
Theories (Lutz 
1987)  
Osterman’s  
Employment 
Systems in Inter-
nal Labor Markets 
(1987) 
to the concept of climate 
 Huselid (1995): explicit focus on 
HR practices as central compo-
nents of HPWS; HR policy con-
sistency is considered to analyze 
“internal fit as moderation” 
6. Level/ 
Domain 
Macro-level:  
 whole organiza-
tion /all Employ-
ees (assump-
tion: high im-
portance of spe-
cific human capi-
tal for all jobs; 
or: assumption 
that ILM exist 
where specific 
human capital is 
important ) 
 Walton (1985): meso-level of the 
production plant; however, the 
recommendation of a commit-
ment system is suggested on a 
macro-level of analysis  
 Arthur (1994): macro-level (firm 
with one steel minimill) 
 Huselid (1995): macro-level – 
one system for all 
Meso-level: 
1. ILM: employees 
with specific hu-
man capital  
2. Craft markets 
/professional 
HRMS: employ-
ees with profes-
sional and craft 
human capital 
 3. Secondary 
HRMS: employ-
ees with very low 
or no formal edu-
cation  
Meso-level: 
1. Industrial 
subsystem: 
blue collar 
workers 
2. Salaried 
subsystem: 
white collar 
workers 
3. Craft system: 
craftsmen 
 Secondary 
subsystem: em-
ployees without 
any (formal) ed-
ucation  
7. Effect  
mechanisms 
 Specific human 
capital increases 
risk of opportun-
ism (fundamen-
tal transfor-
mation of em-
ployment rela-
tion); 
  ILM results in 
“orientation of 
interests” of indi-
vidual employ-
ees on current 
employer, thus 
mitigates indi-
vidual opportun-
ism and curbs 
number of wage 
negotiations 
 Walton (1985): implementation of 
a commitment system is sug-
gested to lead to a higher firm 
performance by enhancing indi-
vidual’s motivation and work sat-
isfaction and reaching standards 
of excellence 
 Arthur (1994): control versus 
commitment HR systems moder-
ate the relationship between 
turnover and manufacturing per-
formance by creating a specific 
organizational context; the com-
mitment system is, thereby, as-
sociated with a higher level of 
manufacturing performance – 
greater productivity, lower em-
ployee turnover and superior 
scrap rates 
 Huselid (1995): a higher degree 
of implemented HPW practices 
will lead to a higher firm perfor-
mance by reducing the level of 
employee turnover and increas-
ing the level of productivity 
 Type of human 
capital and long 
term employment 
results in long 
term orientation 
of employees 
interests on em-
ployer or external 
market 
 Closure of ILMs 
only results if 
supply of man-
power is scarce 
 No clear state-
ment, but central 
idea is that em-
ployer designs 
the system sys-
tematically un-
der considera-
tion of re-
strictions, alter-
natives, goals 
etc. 
 No statement to 
the effect mech-
anisms on indi-
vidual behavior 
8. Systems 
Aspect 
 Implicit state-
ment: All ele-
ments are need-
ed in interaction 
with each other 
to achieve re-
sults in curbing 
 Walton (1985): suggestion of a 
wide variety of company-specific 
forms but identification of a 
“overall pattern” (p. 77) of the HR 
strategy 
 Arthur (1994): identification of HR 
cluster patterns that match the 
 More or less 
explicit statement: 
in closed ILMs all 
elements in com-
bination with each 
other are needed 
to achieve results 
 Unclear, wheth-
er all elements 
are needed in 
combination with 
each other 
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Criteria Approach/Theory  
Transactions Cost 
Economics  
(Williamson/ 
Wachter/Harris 
1975) 
From Control to Commitment to 
High Performance HR Systems 
(Walton 1985; Arthur 1994; 
Huselid 1995) 
Old Segmentation 
Theories (Lutz 
1987)  
Osterman’s  
Employment 
Systems in Inter-
nal Labor Markets 
(1987) 
opportunism;  
 however, this is 
not explicitly 
proved 
description of control versus 
commitment systems; reference 
to the concept of equifinality 
 Huselid (1995): reflected in the 
analysis of internal and external 
fit of HPW practices 
9. Strength  No explicit 
statements 
about strength 
 Implicit idea in 
the approach: 
Simple system 
with clear struc-
ture, implemen-
ted for all em-
ployees to col-
lectively com-
plement  the 
individual con-
tracts 
 This should re-
sult in a very 
strong system 
which sends 
clear signals 
how to act within 
the individual 
employment 
relation 
 Implementation 
is not discussed 
 Walton (1985): implicitly ad-
dressed by the underlying norma-
tive recommendation of the 
commitment systems. After the 
firm has gone through a transi-
tional stage and has fully imple-
mented commitment strategy the 
strength of a system is able to 
unfold its positive effects which 
lead to a higher level of plant per-
formance in all categories 
 Arthur (1994): test of the particu-
lar systems’ strength in moderat-
ing the relationship between a 
minimills’ turnover and manufac-
turing performance 
 Huselid (1995): higher level in 
implementing of HPW practices 
can be associated with the firm’s 
potential to reach a higher level 
of firm performance 
 No explicit state-
ments about 
strength; 
 Implicitly one can 
conclude that clo-
sed ILMs are 
strong systems 
which are fully 
implemented; 
and that many 
aspects of craft 
systems are only 
as strong as the 
framing institu-
tions;  
 Strong references 
to organization 
costs associated 
with change of 
HRM systems 
and thus with cost 
of implementation 
and change/non-
change 
 No clear explicit 
statement about 
strength 
 
3.5  HR Architecture (Lepak/Snell 1999, 2002) 
The starting point of Lepak and Snell (1999) is the micro-macro-level divide and the 
suggestion that “it may be inappropriate to simplify the nature of human capital in-
vestments and suggest that there exists a single optimal HR architecture for managing 
all employees” (Lepak/Snell 1999: 32). In fact, HR practices will vary between different 
groups of employees depending on the degree to which their human capital is im-
portant for the firm’s competitive advantage. Against the backdrop of the existing 
literature, Lepak and Snell (2002: 518) state that the “empirical examination of HR 
systems at this employment group level of analysis remains limited”. Therefore, the 
purpose of their “study is to address these issues by focusing on HR systems used for 
employees in different employment modes”.  
Lepak and Snell (1999, 2002) introduce the concept of the firm’s “HR architec-
ture” which is based on transaction cost theory, human capital theory and the re-
source-based view. The HR architecture consists of four distinct quadrants, each of 
which combines a certain employment mode with a specific employment relationship 
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and HR configuration as a function of the employees’ human capital value (core ver-
sus peripheral) and uniqueness (firm-specific versus generic). The four identified em-
ployment modes – (1) internal development, (2) acquisition, (3) contracting, and (4) 
alliance – refer to the internalization or externalization of employment and human 
capital building (the make-or-buy decision regarding the human capital stock of an 
organization). The described employment modes embody a specific employment rela-
tionship: (1) organization focused, (2) symbiotic, (3) transactional, and (4) partnership. 
Furthermore, the different employment modes and relationships can be related to a 
specific HR configuration: (1) commitment, (2) market based, (3) compliance, and (4) 
collaborative. These HR configurations represent a combination of certain HR prac-
tices such as staffing, training, appraisal and rewards “that define the employment 
mode, maintain the employment relationship and support the strategic characteristics 
of human capital” (Lepak/Snell 1999: 32). Thus, it is the configurations that come 
closest to the HRM systems approach with the employment modes and relationships 
as components of these systems.  
Four quadrants of human capital characteristics and employment modes are the 
result: 
Table 2:  Dimensions of the HR architecture  
(own illustration with reference to Lepak & Snell 1999, 2002) 
Quadrant (1) Knowledge-Based Employment 
(2) Job-Based 
Employment 
(3) Contractual Work 
Arrangements 
(4) Alliances/  
Partnership 
Strategic value of 
human capital high high low low 
Uniqueness of human 
capital  high low low high 
Employment mode internal development acquisition contracting alliance 
Employment  
relationship organization focused symbiotic transactional partnership 
HR configuration commitment productivity- based compliance collaborative 
 
In the first Quadrant (1) “Developing Human Capital” (Lepak/Snell 1999) or 
“Knowledge-Based Employment” (Lepak/Snell 2002), the employees’ human capital 
is valuable and unique. Individuals who have this kind of human capital can be seen as 
knowledge workers, e. g. engineers in the high technology sector and core employees 
of the firm who have a high impact on the organizations competitive advantage. Due 
to an economic as well as a strategic rationale, firms are going to choose a knowledge-
based employment mode that is oriented towards the skills and competencies of em-
ployees to develop the human capital internally. Correspondingly, the employment 
relationship is organization focused and relational. It is characterized by a long-turn 
and mutual commitment between employer and employee. To support the organiza-
tion-focused employment relationship, a firm is likely to implement a commitment-
based HR system (Lepak/Snell 1999 with reference to Arthur 1994) that is character-
ized by loosely defined jobs, staffing decisions that are based on the employee’s po-
tential, extensive training, developmental appraisal, skill-or team-based pay. Lepak and 
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Snell (1999) draw a parallel to high-performance work systems (Huselid 1995; Lawler 
et al. 1995) in this connection. 
The human capital type in quadrant (2) “Job-Based Employment” has a high stra-
tegic value, however, it is not unique and available in the external labor market. There-
fore, the firm is going to rely on a human capital acquisition for predetermined jobs to 
internalize employment. However, it is not going to develop the required human capi-
tal internally. The focus lies on job-based staffing rather than on development. The 
corresponding employment relationship is symbiotic in the sense that it is based on 
mutual benefits for employer and employee. The employees are more oriented to-
wards their profession and career than to a specific firm. For these job-based employ-
ees, for example, loan officers in the banking industry, a productivity-based HR con-
figuration that is focused on selective hiring and staffing to identify employees who 
are able to immediately perform a required job is appropriate. Such employees are 
offered a market-equivalent pay and a result-oriented component. 
In quadrant (3) “Contract Work”, employees have human capital that is neither 
specific nor highly valuable to the firm. In this case, a firm is able to contract work 
through the short-term hiring or leasing of temporary workers for low-level jobs, e. g. 
administrative staff. The employment relationship will be transactional (Rousseau 
1995) which is focused on the economic aspects of a short-term exchange with a lim-
ited level of personal involvement and organizational commitment. In the “Compli-
ance” HR system, HR practices focus on the enforcement of explicit rules and proce-
dures to secure the employees’ behavioral conformance with organizational goals and 
standards. Further characteristics are limited training activities, job-based performance 
appraisals and hourly wages that refer to the accomplishment of standardized tasks. 
Quadrant 4 “Alliances/Partnerships” refers to human capital that is unique but 
has a limited potential to create strategic value for the firm and, therefore, is not con-
sidered to be developed internally, e. g. the knowledge of an attorney or of a scientist 
that performs basic research. The alliance-employment mode represents a hybrid be-
tween internalization and externalization: It is based on an occasional but long-term 
external partnership where customized services are provided to client firms to achieve 
a mutual goal in form of a co-specialized asset. Examples are partnerships between an 
organization and a research laboratory, legal or management consultants or accounting 
firms. The employment relationship is based on partnership to build up trust and a 
mutual investment of both parties. However, both partners will attempt to protect 
their specific investments and knowledge. In the related collaborative HR system, HR 
practices such as training, e. g. job rotation or mentoring programs, are focused on the 
overall relationship rather than on the individuals human capital development. They 
have to support cooperative behavior, trust and team building as well as information 
sharing and knowledge integration. Additionally, evaluations will be developmental 
and performance appraisals and rewards team-based. 
In conclusion, this conceptual framework focuses on the effective management 
of human capital allocation and development as the basic HR problem. In terms of 
transaction costs and strategic considerations, the aim is to outline criteria for a firm’s 
efficient and strategically appropriate investment in human capital on the basis of the 
internalization versus the externalization of employment. The approach can be located 
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on a meso-level, where subgroups of employees with different human capital characteris-
tics define the boundary between the four HR subsystems. The central effect mechanism 
can be seen as the firm’s mode of investing in human capital that is aligned with a 
certain human capital type and a function of strategic value and uniqueness. In their 
description of specific combinations of employment modes, employment relation-
ships and HR configurations, Lepak and Snell (1999, 2002) directly address the system 
aspect for each quadrant, on the one hand, and for the overall HR architecture as com-
bination of different subsystems, on the other hand. They highlight the importance of 
managing the whole architecture with all its quadrants in this regard. In terms of 
strength, a greater fit or congruence of the employment mode, the employment rela-
tionship and the HR configuration in a certain quadrant is associated with a higher 
level of efficiency and can be related to a greater strength of the subsystems and the 
overall HR architecture.  
3.6  Employment systems (Hendry 1995, 2000, 2003) 
Against the backdrop of the concept of psychological contracts, the resource based 
view and labor market theories, Hendry (1995, 2000, 2003) develops a conceptual 
approach with between five and eight employment systems.  
From Hendry’s perspective, the overall aim of the employer and the one relevant 
HR strategy is to “secure skills cost-effectively” (Hendry 2003: 1433), which means to 
secure the endowment with skills, on the hand, and the motivation of skilled employ-
ees, on the other hand, and both should be done cost-effectively. With this descrip-
tion, the basic HR problems to be solved by the employment system are stated: endowing 
the organization with the skills needed, securing motivation and controlling cost in 
doing so. Given this supposedly universal HRM strategy of securing skills cost-
effectively, HRM systems are described by generic elements or components in a system of 
HRM, and these are: 1. points of entry into an HRM system, 2. nature of the jobs as 
low or high skilled and as narrowly specialized or involving a broad range of tasks, 3. 
number and type of career ladders within the system, 4. promotion rules and criteria, 5. 
training opportunities, 6. job security, 7. pay determination, 8. employee involvement.  
Hendry proposes that the employers differentiate employment systems with re-
gard to the level of the skills (high and low), on the one hand, and the form of control 
of the workers, on the other hand (personal control, organization control and market 
control). Thus, we have a classification with six different primary types of employment 
systems: 
Table 3 
Skill Level 
Type of Control 
Personal Organization Market 
High Skill Associate employment system Career employment system Occupational employment system 
Low Skill Family/political employment system Industrial employment system Market employment system 
 
Besides these “traditional” systems, there are two systems, the “commitment HRM 
system” and the “performance management HRM system”, which emerge from firms’ 
114  Dorothea Alewell, Nina Katrin Hansen: Human Resource Management Systems 
 
reactions to boundary tensions and developments in supply and demand on the labor 
market. Thus, all in all, we have eight different employment systems in this approach and 
these systems are clearly described on the meso-level of the firm, as Hendry (2003) sees 
these systems as addressing differing groups of employees within a firm. At the same 
time, the development of the classification by a matrix made up of skill differences 
and the form of control clearly hints at the systemic combination of these bundles of 
specific elements.  
Due to space limitations, we cannot describe all of Hendry’s employment sys-
tems. Therefore, we will only use one example to illustrate his statements about central 
content of the employment systems: “Career employment systems” for highly skilled employ-
ees with organizational control resemble the traditional internal labor markets very 
closely. There are only a few ports of entry, promotions go along well-defined career 
ladders and most movements up the career ladder are linked to seniority. Employees 
enjoy high job security and develop firm-specific skills via on-the-job-training. Fixed 
salaries dominate compensation; there are no extrinsic rewards or incentives to further 
stimulate performance. The labor force is managed through bureaucratic rules and 
procedures, which ensure fairness, loyalty of the staff and low labor turnover with 
minimal recruiting cost. There is a high trust environment established with the as-
sumption that the workforce is reliable and effective; the need for direct supervision is 
supposed to be low. Hendry uses elements from differing components as, for example, 
climate (high trust environment), policies (job security) and practices and programs 
(on-the-job-training, employee involvement), although he himself describes the em-
ployment systems as bundles or set of specific practices (Hendry 2003: 1434). Effect 
mechanisms are all related to securing skills (availability and motivation of skilled em-
ployees) and securing cost-effectiveness in doing so. Concerning strength, Hendry 
(2003: 1438) does not make any explicit assumptions. However, he assumes that there 
are some internal factors that influence the design and implementation of employ-
ments systems as, for example, technology, management philosophy, size, stage of 
growth, ownership, traditions of trade unionism and business strategy as well as the 
existing system of employment; but, on the other hand, these internal factors reflect 
and respond to an external competitive environment and institutional influences that 
play a powerful part in shaping the employment system as, for example, the economic 
situation, sector competitive conditions, industry structure, stability of product mar-
kets and technological opportunities, sources of labor, influences on labor market 
participation, the role of trade unions and professional associations in controlling the 
supply of labor. Thus, if these external factors change, the employment system will 
partially change, too, sometimes to a degree that a new “emergent” employment sys-
tem will come into being, thus reducing the strength of the “old” system and mixing it 
up with new elements. We may interpret this as an implicit hint at the impossibility of 
having strong systems in changing environments. 
3.7 Neoinstitutionalistic theory of employment systems  
(Köhler/Krause 2010) 
Building on the Munich approach (see above), Köhler and Krause (2010) analyze the 
material of about 100 intensive case studies about labor market segmentation and 
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employment systems in firms. Trying to structure the qualitative material, they differ-
entiate between four different real type HR subsystems, which they describe by combining 
two dichotomies – internal and external systems, on the one hand, and primary and 
secondary systems, on the other. These systems differ centrally by the subset of jobs 
and employees they refer to, by the degree of closure against other internal or external 
HRM systems within or outside the firm, a dominant indicator of which are internal 
mobility patterns and the duration of employment, and by distinct rules and structural 
patterns of allocation, qualification and gratification within the systems. Central state-
ments with regard to the content of the systems are as follows: Primary internal systems denote 
the typical internal labor market with low employment risks for employees and high 
duration of employment relations. Primary external systems denote the classical craft 
subsystem; they offer employment security through employability and on the basis of 
between-employer-mobility; wages and performance are defined in relation to the 
external labor market. Secondary external markets resemble the typical tayloristic sec-
ondary markets with low wages, low employment security, low qualifications and high 
risks for the employees. Secondary internal markets are not described in detail, but 
they will have comparatively low wages and long employment duration combined with 
low qualifications of the employees. These systems may coexist within one firm; Köhler 
and Krause (2010) argue that it is the norm rather than an exception that firms oper-
ate with more than one differing employment system, and that the old assumption of 
a close match of HR system and firm becomes increasingly problematic (p. 396 and 
398). Examples from empirical research are given which show that these systems are 
positioned on a meso-level in organizations, comprising certain groups of employees 
which are characterized by specific tasks and qualification requirements.   
The basic HR problems that the systems refer to are viewed from the perspective of 
the employer and the employee: While for the employer the endowment with HR 
resources i.e. their availability and their effectiveness, are the relevant problems, for 
the employee securing one’s own subsistence via securing one’s wage income is cen-
tral. The central effect mechanisms described refer to the individual interest of the con-
tract parties – employer and employee negotiating the employment relations with 
partially conflicting interests; the resulting patterns of allocation, gratification and 
qualification reflecting their respective influence and strategies, which result partially 
from their reference to the internal or external markets. The systems aspect is tackled by 
assuming the differing interests of the two contract parties, their market-based influ-
ence, strategies and the risk allocation between them together with the references to 
the external institutions and markets constitute the system. Thus, in this approach the 
system is not primarily defined on the level of complementary HR instruments or 
policies, but an important component of the system is the type of employment relation 
and its market reference. With this, the authors give their work an explicitly stated 
foundation in assumptions about the employment relation, which is related to the 
proposal of Godard (2004) for the HPWS. 
Strength is not tackled explicitly in the approach, but the authors describe a num-
ber of changes in the systems, thus assuming that strong systems may be transformed 
or may erode to weaker systems under the pressure of external and internal forces. 
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They describe several aspects of change in the HRM systems, and thus, as Lutz (1987) 
did in his older approach, integrate a dynamic perspective into their analyses. 
For a summarizing comparison of the approaches in chapter 3.5 – 3.7 see table 4. 
Table 4: 
Criteria Approach/Theory  
Employment Systems  
(Hendry 1995, 2000, 2003) 
HR Architecture 
(Lepak/Snell 1999, 2002) 
Neoinstitutionalistic Theory of 
Employment Systems 
(Köhler/Krause 2010) 
Content Criteria 
1. Number 
and Type of 
HRM systems 
Eight Types (six primary types 
and two emergent types): 
1.  Career  
2.  Industrial/clerical, 
3.  Occupational  
4.  Market,  
5.  Family/political 
6.  Associate  
7.  Commitment  
8.  Performance management 
Four configurations of HR 
practices:  
1. Commitment 
2. Productivity-based 
3. Compliance 
4. Collaborative 
Four Types: 
1. Primary internal system (ILM) 
2. Primary external  system (craft 
subsystem) 
3. Secondary internal system 
4. Secondary external system (sec-
ondary market/tayloristic market) 
2. Coexist-
ence of 
differing 
types of HRM 
systems 
within one 
organization? 
 Yes, explicitly  Yes, explicitly  Yes, explicitly 
3. Central 
content 
based  
statements    
 Employment systems differ 
centrally by skill level 
(high/low) and by form of 
control (personal, organiza-
tion, market); the combina-
tion of these two criteria 
forms the six primary em-
ployment systems 
 Elements of the systems are: 
ports of entry, nature of the 
job, career ladders, promo-
tion rules, training opportuni-
ties, job security, way pay is 
determined, employee in-
volvement 
 Four employment modes, 
relationships, HR configu-
rations 
HRM systems differ centrally by 
 the subset of jobs and employee 
they refer to, 
 the degree of closure against other 
internal or external HRM systems, 
a dominant indicator of which is the 
duration of employment, 
 distinct rules and structural patterns 
of allocation, qualification and grati-
fication 
4. Basic HR 
problems 
addressed 
 Securing skills (endowment 
with skills and ensuring moti-
vation of skilled employees) 
cost-effectively 
 Effective management of 
human capital allocation 
and development;  
 Effective management of 
investment in human capi-
tal/employment under-
stood as internalizing and 
externalizing human capi-
tal building 
 
 Motivation/ incentives; 
 Qualification/ endowment with 
human capital 
 
Process Criteria 
5. Compo-
nents 
 Explicit statement of em-
ployment systems as set of 
specific practices; 
 In the description of the 
systems components of cli-
mate, policies, and practices 
 Explicit: HR configurations 
as specific combination of 
HR practices 
 Implicit: the employment 
modes and relationships 
could be related to specific 
 No explicit statement; practices, 
policies, principles and climate are  
all mentioned in combination with 
the psychological contract and its 
expectation structures 
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Criteria Approach/Theory  
Employment Systems  
(Hendry 1995, 2000, 2003) 
HR Architecture 
(Lepak/Snell 1999, 2002) 
Neoinstitutionalistic Theory of 
Employment Systems 
(Köhler/Krause 2010) 
are mentioned HR policies and a certain 
climate but refer to differ-
ent levels 
6. Level/ 
Domain 
Meso-Level: 
 Sub-Groups of employees 
with high or low skills and 
under differing forms of con-
trol (personal, market, organ-
ization)  
Meso-level:  
 Subgroups of employees 
with different human capi-
tal characteristics 
Meso-level; examples for domains: 
 Primary internal system (ILM): 
Research and development de-
partments, customer service of 
banks, care jobs in hospitals   
 Primary external system (craft 
subsystem): jobs in construction, 
software design, health industry 
 Secondary internal system 
 Secondary external system (sec-
ondary market/tayloristic market) 
7. Effect 
mechanisms 
 No clear statement, but 
central idea is that employer 
secures skills cost-effectively 
 Mode of investment in 
human capital is aligned 
with certain human capital 
types as a function of stra-
tegic value and unique-
ness 
 Approach is based on a negotiation 
or exchange based idea with strong 
individual focus 
 HRM systems are used as long as 
they are advantageous for both 
parties;  
 If not, employer and/or employee 
will resort to market alternatives 
with the corresponding repercus-
sions of the market on HRM sys-
tem 
 Central effect mechanism is indi-
vidual interest of each party 
8. Systems 
Aspect 
 Explicit statement about 
systematic combinations of 
skill level and form of control 
 Specific combinations of 
employment modes, em-
ployment relationships 
and HR configurations 
 Explicit statement about systematic 
combinations of employment dura-
tion, manpower needs of the em-
ployer, internal or external orienta-
tion of interest etc. 
 Strong systems aspect 
9. Strength  No explicit statements, but 
implicit statements about the 
influence of external factors 
on the change in employ-
ment systems;  
 Strong systems will erode 
under these constant chang-
es from the outside 
 HR configurations as 
“helping to define the em-
ployment mode, maintain 
the employment relation-
ship and support the stra-
tegic characteristics of 
human capital” (p. 32) 
 No explicit statements about 
strength 
 Implicit statements about strength 
regarding the assumed more or 
less clear and congruent expecta-
tions of employers and employees 
 
4.  Conclusions and implications for further theoretical and empirical 
research 
The comparison of the conceptual and empirical approaches to HRM Systems under 
criteria derived from content and process-oriented research very clearly shows some 
deficient aspects of the state of research in employment systems: 
Types of HRM Systems 
1. There is still a wide variety of proposed ideal or empirically found real type HRM-
systems. Systems classifications range from two types up to eight types of differ-
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ing employment systems, although most approaches aim at describing employers’ 
real choices. There is no clear trend in the literature yet whether two opposed, 
sometimes ideal type HRM systems, are analyzed as reference points or as ex-
treme poles on a continuum of HRM systems lying between these two poles, or 
whether we have more than two, often four or more differential HRM systems 
that are defined by the variation of two or more criteria (see also Lepak et al. 
2006).  
Organizational level of HRM systems 
2. Related to this aspect is the strong diversity in the criteria used to differentiate the 
systems from each other and the strong diversity in the assumption about which 
groups of employees the HRM systems apply to within a firm and how these 
groups of employees are characterized. Thus, the organizational level on which 
HRM systems are located differs. However, most of the approaches define at 
least two HRM systems, thus rooting the HRM systems on the organizational 
meso-level. This has important implications for empirical HRM systems research 
– HRM systems may not be measured on the level of the firm as a whole, but 
they have to be measured with respect to certain segments – of jobs or employ-
ees, depending on the criteria the theoretical concepts imply. Studies that only 
measure which HRM practices are used on the plant or the firm level can only 
capture HRM systems for the special case that the relevant group of jobs or em-
ployees comprises the total firm or plant. 
3. In most content approaches to HRM systems there is no clear reference to the 
components within the firm in which HRM systems will materialize or by which 
HRM systems have to be described. While from the descriptions of the HRM 
systems in most approaches one can implicitly conclude that aspects of climate, 
practices and policies are meant to form the components of the system, this is 
seldom explicitly formulated. On the other hand, some approaches even clearly 
exceed the five components model of Arthur and Boyles (2007) and refer to the 
employment contracts, employment modes, underlying interests of employer and 
employee and the employment relations reference to external market segments. 
Here again, there are many implications for empirical research – the simple op-
erationalization of HRM systems by lists of practices does not fit with most theo-
retical approaches, which often rely on more than one different type of compo-
nent of HRM systems.  
Systemic aspects of HRM systems 
4. Systems are groups of elements that have specific and complementary relation-
ships with each other. Without clear reference to what these elements of the sys-
tem are and what kind of complementarities exist, the systemic character of the 
HRM system cannot be described and analyzed explicitly in detail. Without clear 
reference to the components of the employment system the expected effect 
mechanisms cannot be described in detail, because if there is no clarity about the 
components forming the system and their relationship with each other, the ele-
ments of the HRM system that inter-act with other elements in the firm to pro-
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duce the effect mechanisms cannot be defined clearly. Conceptual and empirical 
studies should take more care of this aspect.  
Effects and effect mechanisms 
5. There is no clear trend in the literature as to the effect mechanisms analyzed in 
HRM systems research. While some approaches, mainly stemming from strategic 
Human Resource Management, analyze the relationship between HRM systems 
and firm performance variables, others define effects on HRM outcomes as per-
sonnel flexibility or control over HR cost and still others make no explicit refer-
ence to expected outcomes. Very few authors clearly state performance effects on 
both levels, firm level and HRM level, and analyze the interaction effects between 
both levels of effects, too. A side effect of this deficit is that the motivation to 
implement an HRM system is not clear – if the expected effects differ, the incen-
tive to use the HRM systems may differ. A deeper analysis of these effect mecha-
nisms would further the current discussion about the micro-foundations of col-
lectivistic concepts in strategic (Human) Resource Management (e. g. Felin/Foss 
2005; Foss/Minbaeva 2009). Related to this aspect is another deficit which Go-
dard (2004) has already stressed with regard to the HPWS paradigm – most of the 
theoretical concepts tend to neglect the cost of implementing HRM systems. 
However, the effects and effect mechanisms of HRM systems cannot be analyzed 
and cannot be measured empirically if the negative side of the effects and thus in-
centives to refrain from implementing HRM systems are neglected. 
6. Only few approaches clearly state their assumptions about the basis and mecha-
nisms of individual behavior, and there is a huge variety in the theoretical per-
spectives used: psychological contract theory, social exchange perspectives, ra-
tional, transaction cost minimizing and opportunistic behavior, employment rela-
tions and type of employment contract, or no explicit reference at all. A further 
investigation of these issues would also facilitate the analysis of micro-
foundations of central concepts. 
Strength of the HRM systems 
7. The strength of the system and thus the strength of the situation in which em-
ployees perform are probably important for the intensity of the resulting effect 
mechanisms of the HRM system. Thus, a clear conception of strength of the sys-
tem is a basis for all effect related research on HRM systems. Giving more credit 
to the underlying, partially different interests of employers and employees (Go-
dard 2004), the idea of the psychological contract and the forming of expecta-
tions in the employment relation (Rosseau 1995), as well as to attribution theory 
(on this point, see Ostroff/Bowen 2004) might help to improve the theoretical 
foundation of the effects expected. 
External and Internal Factors of Influence and Restrictions 
8. The question of who decides about and influences the HRM systems, their de-
sign, implementation and development, and what the preconditions in terms of 
influence and power to implement such a HRM System are, are rarely discussed 
in the approaches. Many approaches treat the environment of the firm and its in-
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fluence on the employment systems more or less as a black box, including the in-
stitutions of the labor market, although the solution of the basic HR problems to 
be solved by the employment system will very often be dependent on these ex-
ternal factors. Concerning internal factors, the question of whether a centralized 
HRM department in the organization has the power to implement a centralized 
and coordinated HRM system – and thus restrict freedom of decision of line 
managers or decentralized HRM departments – is not discussed in any of the 
studies. We expect however, that the existence and the strength of such a system 
will depend on the relative influence and power of these actors. 
9. A special case of influencing factors is strategy. While some approaches analyze 
the external or internal fit between the firms or the HR strategy and the HRM 
system and the effect of these two types of fit on the effects of the system, other 
approaches completely neglect strategy aspects and do neither analyze aspects of 
HR strategy nor of business unit or firm strategy. The choice of HRM systems 
and their effects may, however, depend on these strategies and should thus be in-
tegrated into the conceptual approaches as well as into empirical studies. 
10. There is a number of further “determinants” of the effects of HRM systems 
(Bloom/Van Reenen 2010: 36ff). For some of these external factors it is not clear 
whether they themselves represent simple determinants or practices or resources 
complementary to HRM. This is true, for example, for the firms’ endowment 
with information and communications technologies. The underlying question is 
whether the HRM systems perspective has to be augmented by a systems ap-
proach including other organizational resources and practices beside HRM be-
cause of relevant complementarities between both areas. However, most concep-
tual approaches to HRM are more or less silent concerning this question. 
If progress in conceptual and empirical research about HRM systems is to be made, 
the aspects mentioned above should be more explicitly analyzed and integrated into 
research. Authors should especially consider the following points: First of all, for a 
better empirical foundation of the theoretical conceptualization of HRM systems a 
clear distinction between different levels of analysis (meso versus macro level) is es-
sential. Additionally, the question to which employee groups HRM systems are ap-
plied has to be answered. This may presumably be a function of firm size (one HRM 
system in a small plant versus several HRM systems in a large corporation). In terms 
of a process perspective, the different components of HRM systems have to be taken 
into account and the question whether all components are fully implemented and 
whether the system can be seen as a “strong system” has to be analyzed. Furthermore, 
a clear definition of complementarities between the components of HRM systems is 
especially necessary to clearly specify and substantiate the assumptions about the an-
ticipated positive and negative effects of HRM systems on the employed individuals as 
well as on collective measures such as HR outcomes and firm performance. Finally, a 
systematic analysis of internal (e. g. power relationships, firm strategy, complementari-
ty of resources etc.) and external factors of influence (e. g. labor market structure, 
environmental dynamics etc.) can enhance research on HRM systems and can build a 
solid ground for future empirical studies in this vibrant field of research. 
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